3.126 Fall and Rise of China: The first Encirclement Campaign

Last time we spoke about the establishment of the Jiangxi Soviet. After the CCP's failed uprisings, Mao Zedong and Zhu De fled to rural China, determined to build a strong, agrarian-based Red Army. Mao narrowly escaped capture and regrouped with fewer than 1,000 soldiers, facing morale and loyalty issues. To rebuild, he implemented reforms, creating political structures within the army to strengthen revolutionary spirit and establish troop soviets for democratic centralism. Seeking refuge, Mao negotiated with local bandit leaders Yuan Weicai and Wang Zuo to secure Jinggangshan, a defensible mountain area. The Red Army began guerrilla operations, seizing nearby villages and towns, rapidly expanding territory. Over time, despite facing encirclement campaigns by Nationalist forces, Mao’s Red Army persevered, using flexible tactics, alliances, and propaganda. This period laid the groundwork for the growth of the Jiangxi Soviet, where the Red Army united diverse groups and adapted communist policies to local conditions, eventually strengthening their movement for future battles.   #126 The first Encirclement Campaign Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. We last left off with the establishment of the Jiangxi Soviet and its expansion into Fujian province. In spite of the continuous attacks by provincial and NRA forces, the communist movement was flourishing in the countryside. After the multiple failed uprisings in 1927, support for urban insurrection as the cornerstone of the revolution was fragmented. Likewise the KMT unleashed anti-communist campaigns inside major cities, cracking down on communist activities, driving them underground. The urban labor unions were also not very receptive to communist propaganda. A lack of enthusiasm for communism was evident in the early party demographics. In 1928 peasants made up ¾’s of the CCP membership while Shanghai labor union members dropped from 3000 to 700 by 1930. In the face of these statistics, the CCP continued to look at the urban centers as the key to the communist revolution. It was an issue of philosophy. The Central Committee maintained an unwavering belief that the proletariat should carry out urban uprisings as a means of inciting the grand revolution. As the head of the CCP propaganda department, Li Lisan was one of the largest proponents for the urban insurrection model. Li Lisan had returned to China from France in 1928 and argued the proletariat was still very much the center of the movement and that “the peasantry is petty bourgeois and cannot have correct ideas regarding socialism. Only a proletarian mentality can lead us onto the correct revolutionary road.” Li Lishan pushed for the occupation of large cities, rather than expanding the rural Soviets. However his attempts to reinvigorate the labor movements in urban centers was not going well. In 1929 Joseph Stalin came under the belief the communist revolution in China was heating up, citing the economic depression because of the market crash of 1929 as evidence. He had the comintern to begin publishing a series of guidances and measures in February and June of 1929 that reemphasized urban insurrection. In September the Comintern pushed for the CCP to leverage labor unions as a means of delivering the revolution to the masses. In October the Comintern estimated that a crescendo was met and that the revolutionary upsurge was well on its way. Yet the Comintern did not know when the revolution would begin and its subsequent guidance became incoherent to the CCP. Regardless, the CCP took the guidance and prepared to start a revolution. By 1930 the Red Army remained the only force able to lead urban uprisings. Urban labor movements were still not complying, thus Li Lisan was forced to depend on the Red Army. He planned to gain control over the Red Army by establishing central party control over it, dividing the forces away from their leaders. In April of 1930 the Central Committee issued two resolutions for the creation of a General Front Committee to lead urban uprisings. Li Lisan also requested Mao Zedong and Zhu De travel to Shanghai to separate them from their troops. Neither would end up coming to Shanghai. In 1930 the CCP began promoting the Cominterns October directive, reaffirming to all conditions were ripe for revolution, despite the urban labor realities. In February the Conference of Delegates from the Soviet Areas repudiated Mao Zedong's strategies of encircling cities in favor of urban insurrections. To this the Central Committee chastised Mao Zedong and Zhu De’s forces for having what they termed a “hide-and-disperse view,” and instead pushed for the Red Army to concentrate and attack. Clearly the Li Lisan plan was counter to Mao Zedongs. Mao Zedong was promoting slow expansion focusing on land distribution and establishing Soviets, rather than a full frontal attack and seizure of a city like Changsha. Mao Zedong foresaw a slow bottom up model; recruits would start as local village militia, become Red Guards, join the local Red Army forces and then the main Red Army units. Li Lisan saw this as defeatist and wanted to concentrate weapons instead of dividing them equally amongst local militias, Red Guards and other Guerilla units. Li Lisan also complained to his colleagues Mao Zedong’s strategy was too slow and famously said “by such tactics our hair will be white before the revolution is victorious.”  By 1930 the CCP focused on two provinces to ignite its revolution. A series of uprisings would be unleashed in Nanchang, Changsha and Wuhan. It was believed if Wuhan fell, the revolution would spread to Shanghai setting off a worldwide chain of revolutionary events. Things were not looking good for uprisings in cities. From 1926 to 1930 the working class membership of the CCP had dropped from 66% to 8%. The Red Army, despite growing, suffered from a lack of equipment and training. Mao Zedong and Zhu De had their misgivings about the uprisings, but were something of a minority and complied nonetheless. On June 22nd they both issued orders to conduct attacks.  The 1st Red Army Corps, formed from the 4th Red Army was to attack Nanchang while the 3rd Red Army Corps, formed from Peng Dehuai’s 5th Red Army would attack Changsha. Yet against the wishes of Li Lisan, Mao Zedong left 3 army units back at the Jiangxi Soviet to defend the area. The 3rd Red Army corps was the first to attack, capturing Changsha on July 29th. Peng Duhai quickly established a Soviet government with Li Lisan acting as its chairman. However the arrival of Red soldiers did not illicit an urban uprising. On July 30th, British, American, Italian and Japanese ships sailed up the Xiang River to defend their concessions and citizens. Naval bombardment coupled with a lack of urban support dislodged Peng Dehuai’s men from the city by August 3rd. They did however grab as much money and supplies as they could on the way out. After their withdrawal, the NRA occupied the city and began purging all communist sympathizers they could find.  The first Red Army corps did not do much better. Mao Zedong and Zhu De’s men attacked Nanchang, but initially dispatched reconnaissance forces into the city on August 1st. It was quickly determined that little progress could be made, so the forces moved to Liuyang in Hunan. At Liuyang the 1st and 3rd Red Armies consolidated their forces into the first front red army and planned their next move. The assessment for Changsha and Wuhan was quite grim. NRA forces had recently begun reinforcing the two cities while also establishing a defense in depth. Foreign naval ships were stationed along the Yangtze River providing fire support. Mao Zedong and Zhu De both argued against it, but reluctantly agreed to attack Changsha on September 1st.  The second attack against Changsha was a complete disaster. The better equipped enemy, within strong defensive positions, tossed the Red Army on its ass. After 10 days of fighting and facing severe losses, Mao Zedong and Zhu De made a bold move. They ordered a withdrawal on the 13th, stating that Li Lisan was wrong and a change of plan was required. This caused a deep divide in the Red Army, with many political commissars objective to the order. But the Red soldiers complied and conducted an orderly withdrawal. Now there emerged a faction in the CCP backed by Li Lisan calling for another attack against Nanchang. Mao Zedong and Zhu De believed it was impossible as the NRA held an even stronger position at Nanchang. Thus Mao Zedong came up with a compromise: they would attack Ji’an, a strategic city centered on the Jiangxi Soviet. If captured, the southwestern portion of the Jiangxi Soviet would be joined together to greatly expand the Soviet area.  On the morning of October 4th, the Red Army with local militias advanced into Ji’an from 3 different directions and by nightfall captured the city. This was facilitated by a large influx of peasant support for the Red Army, some claim over a million peasants marched upon the city to support the Reds. They also covertly raided the KMT HQ in Ji’an where they discovered documents about an upcoming NRA encirclement campaign. With this discovery the Li Lisan strategy ended as the CCP now needed to secure their survival. Li Lisans epic failure released a cascade of internal power grabs, that influenced the political and military direction going forward. After the second failure at Changsha, Mao Zedong began publicly attacking Li Lisan to increase his own standing. Within the Red Army two diverging viewpoints emerged, that of Mao Zedong’s rural encirclement strategy and Li Lisans urban uprising strategy. Political commissars labeled Mao Zedong as treacherous for attacking Li Lisan, while the peasant troops all agreed with Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong was also confronted with another issue, the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee was also looking to power grab. They were a newly formed committee who were vying for control over the Red Army. Mao Zedong was currently performing a survey over the rural area of Xingguo and while doing so he suddenly identified suspicious linkages between the KMT funded Anti-Boshevik Corps, aka the AB Corps, who had undercover agents charged with sabotaging communist units and the local Jiangxi Action Committee and 20th Red Army leaders such as one Li Wenlin. Armed with this evidence, Mao Zedong unleashed a huge purge of the Red Army. In November he arrested 4000 members of the 20th Red Army, including all but 2 members of the Jiangxi Provincial Action Committee, all charged with treason. The purge effectively negated his little problem, what a coincidence, but it would cause him some headaches. The following month, a battalion of the 20th Red Army led by Liu Dizao captured Futian and there they released 40 recently purged comrades who were suspected to have ties to the AB Corps. The men who let released them then took them across the Gan River to establish a new Soviet in Yongyang. From the Soviet the accused men looked to clear their names and appealed to the Central Committee as well as Zhu De and Peng Dehuai. The 20th Red Army argued they were wrongfully accused of being AB Corps members. It was their argument that Mao Zedong accused them because they had criticized him. A large group of the 20th Red Army left the Soviet apparently to perform peace talks in July of 1931, but would be arrested, put on trial and executed.  This became known as the Futian incident, though quite slanderous, it did not pick up a lot of steam at the time, mostly because the Comintern and Central Committee were too busy condemning Li Lisan for his failures. Zhou Enlai was sent back to Russia to try and clean up the embarrassing Changsha debacle. When h arrived, he distanced himself and the party from Li Lisan, and this effectively handed the congruence to Mao Zedongs strategy, further helping him consolidate power. Added to this the Comintern sent a letter to the CCP in November of 1930 stating Li Lisans ideas were inconsistent with the Cominterns guidance and antagonistic to the greater communist cause. Li Lisan was recalled to Moscow where he tried to save his ass. In the meantime the CCP’s leadership had a difficult time regaining traction until late 1931. Now going back to the documents found, speaking about an encirclement campaign. The NRA dispatch a large force to deal with the Reds. It consisted of the 9th route Army led by the governor of Jiangxi, Lu Diping; the 6th route army from Hunan ld by Zhu Shaoling and the 19th Route army led by Jiang Guangnai. Altogether they were 44,000 men strong, divided into 5 divisions and 3 air-bombing corps. The plan was to encircle the Jiangxi Soviets, pressing them back into the mountains. Once fully encircled the NRA would attack Donggu, Longgang, and Dongshao. After the capture of Ji’an, the Red Army leadership alongside the Jiangxi Action Committee held a conference at Luofang on October 25th, to figure out how to respond to the incoming encirclement campaign. Many called for re-attacking Nanchang and Jiujiang to try and divert the NRA forces away from the Jiangxi Soviet. Mao Zedong argued instead to perform his classic “lure the enemy in deep” strategy. Essentially Mao Zedong wanted to trade land for time. Initially the Red ARmy would evacuate the western areas of the Gan River and head east to mobilize the local people, raise funds and recruit. The eastwards movement would also lure the NRA across the river into Red Army terrain, overstretching their logistics lines. This way the Reds could choose where to face the enemy and hopefully divide and conquer them. It was Mao Zedongs belief the only feasible way to defeat the NRA was to lure them in and then attack places like Nanchang and Jiujiang when they were depleted of defenders.  On November 1st the Red Army began advancing across the Gan River into Ji’an, Jishui, Xingan, Le’an, Yongfeng, Yihuang, Chongren and Nanfeng counties. Within 6 days the Red Army had seized 400,000 yuan and enlisted the support of the local populaces. During this time, members of the 3rd Red ARmy corps rebelled against Mao Zedong’s strategy, arguing instead to occupy the western Gan River area. Peng Dehuai was able to suppress the dissension and by mid November the entire Red Army was occupying the eastern bank of the Gan River. The NRA followed the Reds across the Gan River. By November 18th the NRA were advancing in 3 columns; the first occupied Yongfeng and Jishui; the second occupied Le’an and Yihuang and the third occupied Ji’an. As the NRA continued to advance they had limited engagements against the Reds. By the 26th the Reds were now occupying Donggu, Nanlong and Longgang. Things were all going according to plan, but then the Futian incident hit on December 7th. The mutiny jeopardized the Red Army’s western flank, forcing them to abandon Donggu and the Futian area by December 15th. The remainder of the 3rd ARmy corps advanced to the northern area of Ningdu county and then occupied Pingtian and Anfu.  NRA intelligence began figuring out there was internal strife amongst the Reds and exploited it. On the 16th Lu Diping ordered 2 divisions to encircle and attack Donggu. The 5th and 18th NRA divisions attacked Donggu forcing the Reds to withdraw while attacking the 5th NRA as they did so. The 2 NRA divisions entered the Donggu area each on the opposite side of a ridgeline unable to know what was going on with the other. On the 20th the 18th NRA attacked Donggu with artillery, unknowingly firing upon their comrades in the 5th NRA for half of a day. By the end of December the NRA forces had taken most of the Jiangxi Soviet. However the NRA forces logistical lines were overextended, exposing them to constant guerrilla attacks. They had captured numerous towns each requiring occupation forces seeing only a third of the troops actually at the front lines. The communist efforts to gain the support of the local populaces also saw them hindering the NRA occupational forces. The local populace spied upon the NRA and provided the Reds with information about a pending attack against Longgang.  2 brigades of the NRA 18th Division were going to attack Longgang on December 30th. With this information the Red Army countered by encircling the 2 brigades using mountainous terrain to mass fires and cut off any reinforcements. On the morning of the 30th, the NRA forces entered Longgang only to be surrounded. The 1st Red Army Corps attacked the 2 brigades while the 4th red Army and elements of the 3rd Red Army Corps blocked the 18th NRA division’s rear preventing them from helping from Donggu. By the end of the day the Reds had taken 9000 prisoners, including the divisional commander, Zhang Huizan. Hearing word of the 18th Divisions plight, Lu Diping ordered a withdrawal of the forces to consolidate and reorganize. Tan Daoyuan’s 15th NRA division advanced south towards Yuantou. Again the local populace spied and fed the Reds intel, allowing them to quickly pursue them. On the morning of January 3rd, the Red ARmy attacked the 15th NRA division near Dongshao from 3 different directions. The NRA routed under the attack, many of the troops simply tossed weapons and ran. Meanwhile the 3rd Red Army was unable to fully encircle them allowing many to escape. But nonetheless they managed to capture 3000 prisoners, 4000 rifles, 40 machine guns and a cache of ammunition. The defeats at Longgang and Dongshao effectively ended the first NRA encirclement campaign, providing the Reds with numerous recruits, a lot of equipment and much experience. The destruction of multiple NRA divisions saw 15,000 prisoners, 12,000 weapons captured and had validated Mao Zedongs strategies. The victories spread word of the communist forces' strength in the region and this began to swing the tide of public favor. The Red Army followed this up by executing Zhang Huizan, the commander of the 18th NRA division. His head was sent to Ji’an to serve as a warning. From march to April the Red Army held 4 different meetings to determine strategy going forward. During the first meeting on March 18th many were calling for vacating the Soviet areas because of the NRA’s numerical superiority. Yet no decision was made. The next meeting a month later the same argument was made, but others also advocated for staying and dividing into small units in order to conduct coordinated attacks to break the encirclement and destroy their enemy. Again no decision was made. A third meeting occurred days later, this time acting on Mao Zedong’s advice, the Red Army leadership invited different military units to participate. Dividing forces gained traction, but now they were first asking to make a concentrated attack on the 19th NRA route army to establish a route out of the encirclement. Mao Zedong agreed to this idea, but argued it should be levied against the 5th route army who were facing many issues. The 5th route army were originally from Northern China, thus unfamiliar with the territory. The meeting saw an agreement on attacking and then dividing, but no agreement on target. The final meeting was held in late April, this time with Mao Zedong given the floor to present his perspective. He gave an impassioned speech arguing that luring the enemy in deep made the most sense for 2 reasons. 1) the Red Army and local populace had experience and resolve to defeat the enemy; 2 ) they knew the terrain, Mao Zedong outlined how they could sweep east across the Soviet, hitting the enemy from Futian to Jianning. With the terrain would allow the Reds to isolate the NRA from providing mutual support and allowing them to use overwhelming firepower. Mao Zedongs speech world, the strategy was finally approved. During the period between March and April, while the meetings were held, the Red Army began withdrawing troops from the fringes of the expanded Jiangxi Soviet. Beginning in March the Red Army abandoned the newly acquired towns of Toubei, Dongshao, Luokou, Futian, Tengtian and Zhaoxie. By April 23rd the Red Army had relocated with the 3rd army corps based in Longgang; the 3rd and 4th Red Army’s were stationed in the mountains between Donggu and Futian and the rest of the first front red army in the vicinity of Ningdy. As NRA forces slowly occupied Futian and began advancing east towards Donggu, up in the Jiucun mountain range, the 4th Red Army, overlooking the road from Futian and Donggu prepared an ambush. On May 11th, the 47th and 28th NRA divisions walked directly into the ambush. The Red forces initially rolled boulders from the mountain tops, causing casualties and confusion. The 2 NRA divisions were taken by surprise and began signaling for help, but the Red Army severed their wired communications. Because of the mountains and treelines aerial visibility was poor, neutralizing the NRA’s air forces.The 3rd Red Army descended the mountains and attacked the divisions fiercely. On the night of the 17th, the NRA forces had been defeated. 5000 guns, 50 machine guns, 30 artillery pieces and numerous supplies were captured. Meanwhile the 43rd NRA division originally enroute towards Tantou, received word of the defeat at Zhongdong, so they changed direction towards Shuinan. They planned to ford the Xiaolong River near Shuinan to consolidate their forces. However local communist militia groups had taken the bridge forcing the NRA to advance to Baisha. On May 19th the Red Army defeated the 43rd NRA division at Baisha, seizing 4000 weapons, 30 machine guns and 2 artillery pieces. The NRA attempted to reinforce them with the 19th route army, but they were too late to the scene and upon seeing the destruction pulled back to Xingguo. These 2 defeats effectively destroyed the 5th NRA route army.  Initially the 26th NRA route army was ordered to occupy Nantuan and then advance east. However once they occupied the city, their 27th division received orders to reinforce the NRA position at Zhongcun while the 25th division remained in Nantuan. Before the 27th division could advance, the 3rd Red Army Corps and 4th Red Army attacked Zhongcun, decimating its defenders and occupying the city on May 22nd. That night the Red Army continued to Nantuan where they destroyed the 25th division. This caused the remaining NRA forces to retreat to Le’an and Yihuang. The Red Army captured 3000 weapons, 10 machine guns and effectively eliminated the 26th NRA route army.  Hearing of the destruction of the 26th and 5th route armies, the NRA began withdrawing back to Nancheng. The 5th Division was the last unit trying to depart Guangchang when it was attacked by the 3rd and 4th Red Armies on May 27th. The 5th Division performed a fighting withdrawal to Nanfeng, losing many in the process. Meanwhile at Jianning in Fujian, the 4th Red Army was occupying Guangchang trying to consolidate their gains with a single division advancing north towards Nanfeng. The 3rd Red army corps and 12th Red Army advanced east, hunting down NRA forces into Jianning by May 30th. The attack caught the 56th NRA division completely off guard. They had not yet even established any defensive works. They were routed as the Reds occupied Jianning destroying a NRA regiment in the process. Along with captured numerous war materials the Reds also got their hands on much needed medical supplies. In the course of two weeks the Reds had traveled over 300km’s captured 30,000 prisoners and captured 20,000 weapons. The newfound equipment was enough to outfit the entire first front red army with all modern weaponry, while the older equipment was given to local militia groups. The Red’s success was due to good intelligence and mobility. The second encirclement campaign attempt by the NRA had caused the Soviet to grow nearly 5000 square miles. In June the first front Red Army was still in Western Fujian conducting operations. Initially the Reds did not expect the NRA to initiate a third encirclement campaign so quickly after their failure. The Rds had planned a 3 phase expansion operation in the meantime. Its first phase would encompass political mobilization in Jianning, Taining and Lichuan; the second phase involved marching back into southern Jiangxi to consolidate strength in the rear area; the last phase would send the Red Army back to its original base area focusing on the western Gan River area to try and connect the Jiangxi Soviet with the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet.  The Red army were beginning to receive intelligence reports stating the NRA were beginning to move towards Jiangxi. In response to this the Central Committee issued advice in June of 1931 to counter the new encirclement campaign. They basically just adopted Mao Zedong’s strategy used in the first two campaigns. They argued it was essential to politically mobilize local populaces and support small guerilla units to perform attacks on the NRA forces and prevent them from gaining a stable foothold in the area. They also advocated for the consolidation of the Soviets in the area, this being the Henan-Hubei-Anhui Soviet, Hunan-Hubei Soviet and northeast Jiangxi Soviet. The ultimate goal was to link them all up to form a Red Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi area and perhaps even establish communications with some other Soviets in the north. After sending the advice the Central Committee was forced back underground as the KMT unleashed a suppression campaign in Shanghai. It would not be until August 30th when the Central Committee re-established communications with the Soviets, but by that time the encirclement campaign was over. On June 30th, the Red Army got to work preparing defenses. All local militias, Red Guards and guerilla units were activated to conduct delaying actions and defend localities from the NRA advance. The Red Army, roughly 30,000 men strong pulled back inwards into the central base areas in Jiangxi.This was a difficult task as many of them were spread far into western Fujian and southern Jiangxi. After the 2 failed encirclement campaigns, Chiang Kai-Shek had taken notice and personally took over the third campaign. With him came his own troops as he deployed the 5th and 6th NRA divisions to Jiangxi to attack the 1st and 3rd red army corps. Chiang Kai-Sheks entire force consisted of 2 army corps, with another in reserve and one garrison army. Altogether they were 130,000 strong. In late June the NRA forces advanced into the Jiangxi Soviet. By the end of July they had encircled the entire Jiangxi Soviet. Even with the encirclement the local populace continued to support the Red Army, providing supplies and food. On July 31st the Red Army conducted a daring breakthrough from Xingguo, moving west to Wan’an before circling back to Futian to hit the NRA rear. The Red Army managed to escape the encirclement, but while heading to Futian, the NRA discovered what they were doing and quickly reinforced the area and seized Xingguo. On August 3rd the Red Army began occupying the areas near Gaoxing and Laoyingpan. The Red Army conducted a feint in the north using the 35th red Army, 35th division, 12th red army and the 4th and 5th independent divisions to draw the NRA’s attention west towards Wan’an. As the NRA advanced the first red army corps began attacking through Longgang and Huangpi. On August 6th the 47th NRA division entered Liantang as the 54th NRA division occupied Huangpi. With only one NRA division occupying Liantang, the Red Army took the advantage and isolated them and attacked. The 3rd, 4th and 12th red armies attacked the lone NRA division, routing it before continuing towards Huangpi to attack the 45th NRA division. The 45th divisions HQ was annihilated in the process and by August 7th, two NRA brigades had been destroyed. The two NRA divisions had suffered more than 1000 casualties, with 3500 men captured and 3000 weapons and 14 artillery pieces lost. The Red Army then focused its attention against the 8th NRA division in Huangpi. On the 11th the 3rd Red army distracted the forces in Longgang with sporadic engagements trying to prevent them from reinforcing Huangpi. Meanwhile the 4th and 12th Red armies combated the 8th NRA division while the 3rd Red Army corps and 7th Red Division maneuvered east to cut off their escape route. Within the rainy and foggy weather the Reds annihilated 4 brigades, resulting in more than 1000 casualties, capturing 4000 prisoners, 3000 weapons, 11 artillery pieces and large ammunition cache. The victories also revealed the location of the main Red forces to the NRA. Chiang Kai-Shek acted by deploying all of his forces to surround the Huangpi area, effectively encircling the Red Army. For over a month the Red Army was under siege. Facing starvation and defeat, Mao Zedong and Zhu De hatched a bold plan to break out of the encirclement. They planned to split their forces, first by disguising the 12th red army as the bulk of their forces, having them advance northeast to attack Le’an and Yihuang. The remainder would then move west and occupy Xingguo. On the night of August the 16th the first front red army, minus the 12th red army silently slipped through a 10 km gap between the 1st and 2nd NRA corps heading towards Xingguo. As soon as elements of the 12th Red Army began attacking Le’An Chiang Kai-Shek pounced on them, deploying the 10th NRA division and 1st and 2nd NRA route armies. For two weeks the NRA chased the 12th Red army up and down mountain ranges. The NRA forces were exhausted and consumed a large part of their supplies, constantly attacked by guerillas. In the meantime the 1st the 3rd red army corps arrived at Xingguo undetected where they refitted and reorganized. By the end of August the NRA realized they had been duped and found out the main bulk of the Reds were at Xingguo. The NRA wheeled around to advance upon them, but just before they could two Guangdong Warlord factions rose up against the KMT, forming a rival government. Fearing an attack against Nanking, Chiang Kai-Shek temporarily lifted the encirclement campaign. As the NRA forces pulled away, the Red’s attempted to exploit the situation.  On September 7th, the 3rd Red army and 5th independent red division attacked the 4th NRA corps at Laoyingpan, capturing 2000 men, 2000 weapons and 10 artillery pieces. On the 13th the 7th red army encircled the 4th NRA corps at Fangshiling mountain range while they were trying to retreat to Ji’an. In the process the Reds destroyed the 52nd NRA division and a brigade of the 9th NRA division. With that they captured 5000 prisoners, 4500 rifles and 200 horses. These victories however would be overshadowed by a major defeat at Gaoxing. On that same day the 4th Red Army and 3rd Red army corps were coordinating an assault against the first NRA corps. Based on poor intelligence, the Red Army misjudged their strength resulting in a bloody stalemate. By the end of the encirclement campaign the NRA had suffered greatly. The Reds had destroyed 17 NRA brigades, nearly 30,000 casualties. The Reds losses were quite heavy as well and compromised their position. Yet after these 3 failed encirclement campaigns the Jiangxi Soviet stood at 50,000 square kilometers, encompassing 28 counties in Hunan, Jiangxi and Fujian.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Thus the Reds had survived 3 brutal encirclement campaigns. Even when Chiang Kai-Shek took notice and personally directed his own forces to quell the Red menace, they simply slipped through his hands. Mao Zedong’s strategies were working and further boosting his standing amongst his comrades.